

Moses Mendelssohn

The Statue: A Psychological-Allegorical Dream Vision¹

“I have seen it,” we were told yesterday in our meeting by a young speculative mind who has yet to choose his system; “I have seen the statue à la Bonnet and Condillac, which our friend Engel had brought from France in order to prove his philosophical proposition. I observed it precisely, was attentive to all its movements and utterances, glances and gestures. For it was not a mere statue so much as an ingenious self-moving invention, an automaton of the Vaucansonian type designed to imitate every human behavior, and moreover capable of numerous variations. I witnessed the entirety of its repertoire, but of course only in dream; or, rather: the *genius* of my dreaming only elaborated further the metaphysical-allegorical vision to which Engel, that astute philosopher, had led it.

The son of sleep and poetry was so gracious as to lead me to a hall adorned with many automata of this type. He had one of them step forward, walk to and fro in the hall, and finally sing and dance in a not at all unpleasant way. The mellifluous song filled my ears sweetly, although the words did not seem to have been written by Metastasio, nor the music by the Ritter von Gluck. The dance, likewise, was not of Noverre’s invention; but it made an all the more natural and simple impression. When I had taken sufficient pleasure in this spectacle, I cried: ‘Benevolent *genius*! I thank you for this lovely performance; but show me now also the internal workings that enable this Daedalian statue to entertain the senses so enjoyably. I should not like to feast my senses only, without also becoming more rational [*vernünftiger werden*] by virtue of your graciousness.’ ‘More rational?’ said the divine child. ‘Prim Lady Reason is seldom my friend. She has never been particularly well-disposed towards my father; and my mother, whom she claims to have brought up, has counseled me to show her outwardly all the respect due a matron, but otherwise to pay no mind to her moods and harsh criticisms. All the same: your wish, in part, is granted.’

He touched the image with the bouquet of poppies his mother had bestowed upon him, and the automaton was suddenly transformed into a choir of youths and maidens who, upon the cue of a choirmaster called

Mens or Human Mind seated on an elevated throne at the center, broke into a whirl of song and dance. Each one seemed to maintain unchanged its own position, gesture and expression, no less than its own style of vocal modulation. Meanwhile this all meshed into such a pleasant harmony that for a time I forgot my resolution to become more rational. Finally I called out: 'Propitious daemon! In this great manifold of sounds and movements I cannot keep anything apart. Let the dancers and the singers, both youths and maidens, step forward one at a time to demonstrate their arts. I should like to speak to each one individually and inquire after the manner of their upbringing, and by speaking to their choirmaster learn a thing or two more. Such information would, in our day, in which anything related to pedagogy meets with universal appeal' – 'Well, well, the dream-god replied: I see you desire only material for a society lecture –—. This wish too is granted.' In my dream I then had a long discussion with these *genii* in which I learned many an interesting fact that I planned to write down upon waking in the morning. I stepped up to my writing desk, and – behold! I found the sum of the entire discussion with the *genii* as well as with their leader written down by my own hand on a leaf of paper.

How – where – and when did I write this? While dreaming in the night? – I must have been sleepwalking; and why not? Having somnambulated once, or even several times in the course of one's life, does not make one a somnambulist any more than having been drunk a number of times makes one a drunkard. We all more or less have the capacity to produce, while dreaming, certain voluntary movements that correspond more to our dream state than to the state in which we really find ourselves. This occurs whenever the images dreamt are vivid enough to influence the organs of motion and trigger their corresponding movements. Now in the usual condition, of course, this dream and its influence on the limbs is interrupted after a duration too short to earn it the title of somnambulism. But if a dream is sufficiently coherent and composed of potent images, it can also bring forth compound changes in the sense organs and sustain them for a time. This series of voluntary changes brought forth by the dreamer we call somnambulism, and a person whose body has the capacity to do this often we call a somnambulist. – It will thus suffice if I merely copy down my nocturnal essay, here and there filling in the few remaining gaps.

There first appeared two youthful boys who called themselves Sight and Touch. The two lived in intimate friendship; having been schoolmates, they

shared everything they knew and all their sorrows and joys. The former had a brother he took in tow everywhere he went. He called himself Spacevision to distinguish himself from his brother, whom he called Colorvision. The brothers had everything in common except for the intimate friendship of Touch, which Colorvision was incapable of winning. Colorvision also took little interest in the collaborative studies of Spacevision and Touch, and abandoned himself to his own play whenever they discussed the sciences. – They had learned, among other things, the first principles of geometry; or had rather discovered [*erfunden*] them themselves, as Blaise Pascal boasts. Spacevision, a boy rife with imagination and hubris, took all the credit for the discovery himself, and the kind-hearted *genius* Touch for a long time allowed himself to be convinced that it was so. But one day, when the brothers Spacevision and Colorvision were absent from Professor Saunderson's class, Touch had a go at the whole of geometry and discovered that his knowledge sufficed on its own to invent this divine science, and that Spacevision had merely provided him with a few expressions and figures of speech to elucidate the propositions; but that these were by no means necessary. Indeed, he even went so far as to translate the entire theory they had set down together for Colorvision into his own personal concepts, language, and figures of speech, as meager as his contact with Colorvision had otherwise been. He thus invented an optics for people born blind, and had it taught publicly by Professor Saunderson.

When this *genius* later disclosed all this to his friend Spacevision, it seemed to cause a distance to develop between them. At the same time, the perspicacious *genius* Spacevision noticed that he too would have invented a kind of geometry without the assistance of Touch; even if it were not the same one they had invented together. For he would have proceeded from other, more one-sided foundational concepts and would have had to translate, as it were, all the words and figures of speech of their collective mathesis into his own language, premising other principles and postulates; and he would have come to conclusions suitable only for the sense of sight. This observation brought the friends closer together again. They saw that they had equal claims and equal accomplishments, and determined that it would thus be more beneficial to abstain from asserting unilateral rights in order to better cultivate the common element of their inventions and apply them in the most useful ways to the other sciences.

They thus pooled their knowledge and settled their concepts of space, distance, height, depth, line, angle, surface, motion, and other such words

as have their own specific meaning in the dialect of each sense; words that are constituted in such a way, however, that each sense can make itself understood through the language of the others. In the language of Sight, for instance, a straight line is one that, when viewed from one of its endpoints, cannot be distinguished from a point; or one that rises gradually from the horizon as its parts move further away from the eye. A sphere is a body whose shadow is circular from all sides. In the language of Touch, these explanations are expressed differently; according to their essence, though, they are the same. And not only did the boys always understand each other in discussing such matters; the reports of their observations and activities, which they were obliged to submit to the choirmaster, were lucid and received with applause.

The other boys' reports fell far short of this clarity. Their presentations seemed more sensation, or sensationalism, than pure understanding. Hearing – an impatient, voluptuous lad – seemed attentive, at some expense of effort, to time and its measurements; but ultimately more to the end of flattering sentiment and winning over the heart; or else in order to ignite the imagination rather than to educate the understanding. All his images had life and movement. Tenderness, sympathy, and compassion in both sorrow and joy; yet rage and audacity and all the more terrible passions were likewise well within the expressive range of his dialect. It was only to the understanding that his sound-images failed to bring any particular light.

Smell and Taste, whose sensuality was of a coarse, clumsy variety, were so beholden to pleasure that even Imagination wanted nothing to do with them. They lived side by side in much the same intimate way as Sight and Touch. Yet they were of a far more indolent nature and always stuck on the present; they cleaved so to the moment that when it disappeared, it seemed to take all pleasure and all reflection with it. As diverse as the range of their sensations was, they had done almost nothing to arrange them into classes or to express them in words and signs. Coarse sensuality is not particularly sympathetic, and has all the less need of language.

Those divine, inquisitive youths Sight and Touch once wanted to instruct the other *genii* in the mathematical sciences they had invented; but all their efforts to make them comprehensible to the others were in vain. Even if the pupils made use of the same words, they associated them neither with the same nor with similar concepts. At times they merely accepted empty signs from their teachers on faith without having any conscious idea of their meaning. Sometimes, of course, the signs also had some meaning in

their own dialect; but such meanings, being very distant from the signs' true sense, proved fruitless and inconsequential, for they were incapable of advancing their scientific insight. When Hearing spoke of heights and depths, or Taste called an impression sharp or blunt, their concepts were so distant from anything having to do with bodies and surfaces that neither geometric nor arithmetic principles could be of any consequence. In the end, their presentation was only made more confusing by the admixture of poorly understood neologisms; and Imagination, in whose house they had been educated, realized that the efforts to make them scientific had not improved upon their talents and that the reports they were obliged to make to the choirmaster had become neither more comprehensible nor more useful to him.

Full of indignation at her pupils' indocility, and chimeric as is this lady's wont, she arrived at the odd idea of dismissing them from her service completely. 'What they report of external objects,' she thought, 'the children of Reason are able to present just as comprehensibly in their scientific language, but with far more order, precision, and clarity. What is Hearing but a trembling in the nerve fibers of the ear in accord with the undulations of the resounding air? Everything this sense has to offer can thus be indicated by lines and proportions. And Colorvision? It ultimately all comes down to the light beam and the angle at which it is refracted and reflected from the surfaces of bodies. Everything he will ever have to present can thus be specified in terms of lines, angles, and surfaces. This *genius*,' she remarked, 'stands always in a double relation. In respect to his object and its spatiality, without which no color can be conceived, he is most precisely related to Spacevision; but in respect to his effect he has the most striking resemblance to Hearing; such that his perceptions can all be easily substituted with the reports of those kindred senses. In the future we can thus dispense completely with these incorrigible lads,' she went on saying to herself, 'Touch and Spacevision shall henceforth report most faithfully on everything having to do with bodies and their properties; and Hearing on all that depends upon time and its measurement; movement and stasis, and everything related to them, shall be their common task. The remaining *genii* may enjoy their existence in slumber.'

Considering these ideas one morning, Lady Reason and the philanthropic educator had the following conversation:

‘My child! Sound would then be, according to your theory, nothing more than the vibrating of a string, or the undulating of air particles?’

‘What else?’

‘Nonetheless, people hear neither a string nor air, neither vibrations nor undulations.’

‘Because they hear neither in the air nor in the string, but in their ear; or more precisely, in their brain.’

‘But they also hear neither ear, brain, nerve fibers, nerve fluids, nor nerve vibrations. Sound seems to me to be something altogether different.’

‘Rather different indeed. Sound is a sensual, obscure sensation, a sensation in which we do not see things as they are, do not perceive how they are related to objects other than ourselves, but only how we imagine them according to our own limitations.’

‘You think, then, that if sensual knowledge were clear, then people would no longer perceive sound, but instead white or grayish brain fibers vibrating more or less quickly or slowly with a fine nimble fluid flowing through them. Is that right?’

‘What else? What happens in the internal and external organ during hearing is nothing other than such modifications in the finest fibers and vessels, or else in their contents.’

‘My child! Do you not see what this would mean: that if sensual knowledge were more clear, human beings would hear with their fingers or with their eyes? Is this not evident to you?’

‘Not entirely!’

‘What does Hearing know of organs, fibers, fluid, and undulations? What of space, matter, and motion? Human beings owe all of these concepts to their fingertips and eyes. To dissolve sound into such characteristics is essentially to try to grasp it with one’s fingers or to see it with one’s eyes.’

‘But colors –’

‘With colors it is the same. To transform them by lines and angles into definite concepts is to try to grasp them with one’s fingers; – which is just as nonsensical as trying to hear them with one’s ears! Smell and Taste are no different, either. The usual attempt to explain them by reference to a stimulus in the nerve endings borrows both its words and its concepts from the language of Touch and Spacevision; and it does no more to explain the nature of the sensations of taste and smell than taste can be heard or smell be seen.’

‘Nonetheless, the seat of the soul is located somewhere in the brain; and whatever happens in this place during sensory experience can ultimately be nothing other than a movement of solid or fluid matter?’

‘Seat of the soul? – The blind-born man, before his vision was restored, believed nothing else than that his soul resided in the very tips of his fingers.’

‘Indeed, what a bizarre idea!’

‘Not as bizarre as it may seem to you, my daughter! This was the point where all his external sensations came together; the place from which all his clear and definite concepts arose. Did he not have to locate his soul there? – But of his fingertips themselves he did not have the visual concept that a seeing person has of them; not the same variable impression dependent upon light and shadow, brightness and darkness, and all the other modifications of color; but a merely tactile impression of something smooth or rough, hard or soft, raised or recessed. What he could grasp with these fingers – literally grasp with them – he could also grasp with his understanding; for which reason he must necessarily locate the seat of his ideas of things outside himself in the same place from which all his knowledge seemed to come to him.’

‘Right! But –’

‘A little patience! And then his eyes were opened. He gained visual impressions and compared them to the impressions of Touch; posited them both as outside himself, locating them in one and the same object because they

so regularly accompanied one another. But at first he posited the object of both sensations very near to the place where he saw and felt his own body; for which reason all the objects he saw seemed to him to lie close upon his eyes. His soul henceforth vacated his fingertips, where only feelings had their meeting point; for from this moment on, the body had become for the soul a visible image in which distinct organs could be seen and also felt in distinct locations. The soul thus erected her throne in a place to which all the senses seem to have free access, a place not far from the eyes; or – when the sighted blind-born man listens to an anatomy lecture: in the brain. – Finally, he gradually begins to locate the objects he sees and feels, also at some distance, apart from his visible body, depending upon how far he had to move in order to touch an object of Sight. Humans are not as predisposed to locate sound, smell, and taste outside of themselves and to posit them along with the impressions of Sight and Touch in one and the same object, since the objects can often be present without issuing any sound, and since their properties are not distinguishable in such a way that a spatial – ’

‘Please, no lectures on Condillac! Just tell me this: is it not true that everything in physical nature can be explained by matter and motion?’

‘To the extent that this physical nature can be grasped with the fingers or seen with the eyes, it cannot be denied; but also no further. Are not matter and motion themselves, in concept as well as in word, taken from the purviews of each of these senses? Neither pain nor sound, hunger nor smell have the least in common with matter and motion.’

‘What then, Madam, is that which you call mechanical philosophy, which is so lauded by your pupils?’

‘Used in an untimely or inappropriate way, or used too often, anything can be misused. –To do mechanical philosophy means to dissolve a compound phenomenon into its elements; in the world of bodies in particular it means to analyze a phenomenon into the fundamental concepts of extension, resistance, and motion, and to determine the mass, number and weight of every modification; and finally, as far as possible, to compare the magnitudes in the causes with the magnitudes in the organs. To the extent that this method is applied to compound phenomena of Sight and

Touch, it does indeed suffice for explaining them in the most proper way. But when it comes to objects of the other senses, this so-called mechanical philosophy provides only an apparent, and ultimately deceptive kind of explanation.’

‘I bid you provide a more thorough elucidation!’

‘I was just about to provide one. As you know, the impressions of the remaining senses are, in and of themselves, not easy to subsume under mathematical concepts; not easy to determine according to mass, number and weight, because their properties bleed, as it were, into one another and cannot be separated into discrete entities. Yet you yourself remarked that they are consistently in accord with the impressions of Touch and Sight: that a longer string of a particular proportion will produce a particular tone; that a fire whose temperature expands bodies to a certain degree can, all else being equal, also produce a certain sensation of warmth in the human body; and, finally, that a beam of light refracted at a certain angle is always accompanied by the same sensation of color. Thus you came, my child, as you will recall, upon the not unfelicitous idea of comparing the phenomena of the remaining senses to the corresponding impressions of Sight and Touch. By this device you invented the monochord, the thermometer, and Newton’s entire theory of colors in order to subject the phenomena of the other senses to mathematical quantification. The quantities and their relationships could in this way be translated from the realm of the two distinct senses into the impressions of the other senses, for experience had shown that through all modifications, the latter remained in constant correlation with the former. By reducing the remaining sensual modifications to their attendant modifications in the visible and tactile realms, lines and surfaces and numbers were applied where one could speak only of strength and weakness. –

This clever idea made a good deal of sense and had its use. Yet you yourself see that such reduction is merely a tool and does not provide a real explanation. Explaining the sensations of sound, smell, color, and those of hunger and pain by reference to matter and motion means: trying to see sound, hear colors, or grasp hunger with one’s fingers. Since the elements of the remaining senses are not made up of elements of matter and motion, they also cannot be broken down into these elements, which is to say they

cannot be explained in terms of matter and motion. Whenever this happens, it is merely a tool of the art of invention in order to compare unextended² magnitudes, which cannot be measured in and of themselves, with other extended magnitudes and to thereby subsume them under mathematical measurements. But it truly is an abuse of this method if one believes one can make color, taste, smell, hunger, pain and so on comprehensible by reference to lines and angles, space, resistance, and motion. Each sense has, as it were, its own dialect. These concepts of extension and motion are borrowed from the language of Touch and Sight. You are permitted, for the purpose of your inventions, to translate, as it were, from the dialect of the other senses into that of Touch and Sight. But you are deluding yourself if you believe you are thereby making those heterogeneous tongues intelligible.⁷

My essay was still mostly legible up to this point, or at least decipherable, and with minor changes I was able to arrange the thoughts into a tolerable coherency. The rest was incomprehensible, and petered out finally into mere dashes [*Gedankenstriche*]. – The *genius* of my dreaming is, as one can see, from the school of Thomas Berkeley³, which attempts to explain everything idealistically, and does not ascribe extension, shape, and motion to any real object existing outside of ourselves any more than it does sound, color, smell, and taste; or pain, thirst, and hunger. Beattie, Reid, and the other friends of common sense, who have taken the field against the Bishop, refuse to be deceived by such subtleties and have no faith in any speculation that runs counter to sound human understanding. They say that above all, philosophy must not confuse what common human understanding has already set apart and distinguished. Nothing is more clear to the sound human mind than the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of things, as Locke called them. The bodies external to us are, as every man says with complete conviction, really and truly extended; really and truly do have shape and mobility, and can, by means of these basic and primary qualities of which they consist, produce in the organs of sense certain secondary qualities – sound, smell and taste, and by means of these produce them also in our thinking essence and make them become a reality. If only we knew the inner structure of every organ – everyone believes – we would also understand how, by changes to the primary qualities, i.e., to the tissue of the finest fibers, and by motion communicated to it by the extended and moving objects outside of our-

selves, these secondary qualities arise, or rather how sensations and ideas of them can be produced in us.

You do not seem to properly grasp, or to want to grasp, the difficulty that lies here, cry the followers of Berkeley. You merely indicate those visible and tactile modifications that accompany the impressions of the remaining senses, and believe to have thereby explained the sensations themselves. You are only translating from the language of the other senses into the language of Touch and Sight, and you delude yourself if you believe you have in this way illuminated the nature and design of those other senses. It is furthermore disconcerting to hear you base your claims on the support of common sense. Your aim, after all, was philosophical explanation, a promise to satisfy reason.

We indeed acknowledge, respond the former, that your philosophy makes demands we cannot fulfill. It is only that we humble ourselves and abstain from the satisfaction of a reason that in this life cannot be wholly satisfied. Where explaining is beyond our powers, we content ourselves with elucidation. You compare our method to a translation from the dialect of the other senses into the dialect of Sight and Touch – and say that the language of the primordial script [*Urschrift*] does not thereby become more comprehensible? If you say this only in order to humble our philosophy, we acquiesce. But then admit for your part that this method of elucidation should not therefore be discarded altogether. So long as we cannot – to keep with the comparison – so long as we cannot read the primordial script itself, we must avail ourselves of translations. And they would serve us well, if only we had them complete; if only the most important passages were not still riddled with the most significant lacunae. What a light would be shed on the physiology of the human body, and by it on many other sciences and useful forms of knowledge, if we could indicate in the most precise way the architecture of the nerves and muscles, the inner factory of the brain, the nexus and contexture of its smallest parts, and the circulation of fluids within them! Even though all of this would lead, according to your admonition, to merely a complete translation.

Nevertheless – as a disciple of Berkeley, or Engel's metaphysical dream-genius would reply: I do not deny the usefulness such a translation can have; and I am far from reproaching this method in and of itself, or from belittling the efforts of those who would build upon it and fill in its gaps. One ought, however, to always remember that a translation is a translation; and to beware of drawing conclusions about the ingenuity of the primordial

language. Do not imagine, then, that sound and smell, taste and color are nothing more than obscure or confused presentations of figured corpuscles set in motion, as some philosophers have ventured to claim; apparently only for the sake of elucidation at first, in order to show what harmonious modifications may take place in the tactile and visible realms while we are hearing, smelling, and tasting. But ultimately this philosophical modesty disappeared, and they believed they had explained what hearing, smelling, and tasting are. Who was it that called out in philosophical rapture: Give me matter and motion, and I will construct the universe! And even if that braggadocio had had the wisdom of a god, with these materials he would have not been able to bring forth anything but the tactile and visible aspects of the world. He would have still lacked the most basic elements of the impressions and qualities of the remaining senses.

You see, then, how quickly these philosophers forget that a translation is not an original [*Urschrift*]. Yet what should we say to the obliviousness of those who would not only transform all the other senses into touch and sight – in order to, as it were, see sound and touch smell – but who also believe they can explain intelligibly all of humankind's suprasensual concepts, all the effects and functions of understanding and wit, of reason and imagination, by changes to the visible and tactile properties of things? A fine tissue of enmeshed fibers that communicate harmoniously to one another the vibrations and tremors imparted to them by external objects – these are the materials from which they would build an entire mental universe [*Geisterwelt*]; and the laws by which these vibrations are generated and communicated in the visible and tactile realm are supposed to be the same as those from which all the laws of the mental functions can be derived. Depending upon which fibers are jolted and for how long and with how much force, the result can be either a judgment of understanding, a witty notion, or a magnanimous decision. These thinkers must have in fact forgotten that fiber, tissue, vibration, tremor, and all the synonyms they use in support of their hypothesis, are originally borrowed from the language of fingers and eyes, for which reason they cannot make anything understood except for what can be palpated or looked at. They proceeded from the well-founded supposition that every mental modification, all activity of the psyche, has a corresponding modification somewhere in the visible and palpable universe (i.e., in matter). They seem to have deemed it beneficial, at first, to represent the former in images of the latter; to illustrate in the sensual realm and in a material way what was happening in the suprasensual

realm in a mental way; and for this they could be forgiven. But to tout this way of comparing the sensual with the suprasensual – of translating and representing it visually – as explanation is the same as trying to grasp wit with one's hands or see reason through one's spectacles.

These explainers are thus, on my view, guilty of a manifold error of subreption: 1) they make that which can be the object of at most one or another particular sense into the object of all the senses, begging you as it were into accepting the proposition that matter in motion is the substance and object of all sensory experience; 2) they take, completely unnoticed, more than you have conceded; and before you know it, matter in motion has become not only the object of sensation but sensation itself; 3) if you let them get away with this as well, they then dare elevate matter and its objective modifications to the level of the suprasensual concepts and even to that of the effects and functions of the mental powers; 4) they transform, by an incomprehensible magic, this object of some of the senses into the subject of everything sensual and suprasensual as well, i.e., they make the material object of sight and touch into a thing that is not itself supposed to be the impressions of these and all the other senses, but is supposed to perceive them; that is not itself supposed to be the functions of cognition and powers of motion, but is supposed to bring them forth in itself. – It seems to me that this means not only imagining, along with the blind man, the color scarlet as the sound of a trumpet, but rather thinking of the soul itself as a violin, which in the hands of a virtuoso can become an instrument of harmony and euphony, and forgetting about the virtuoso who must first bring forth this divine harmony if we are to recognize the value of the instrument.

Translated by John Koster

Notes

- 1 The essay is found in Moses Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe*, ed. in association with Fritz Bamberger, Haim Borodianksi, Simon Rawidowicz, Bruno Strauß, Leo Strauß, started by Ismar Elbogen, Julius Guttmann, Eugen Mittwoch, and continued by Alexander Altmann with Haim Bar-Dayyan, Eva J. Engel, Leo Strauß, Werner Weinberg. Berlin 1929-32, Breslau 1938. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann-Günther Holzboog, 1974-1998, vol. 6.1, 74-87. References to this edition will be Jub A followed by volume and page number.

- 2 Editor's note: We follow here Moritz Brasch who amends to "unausgedehnte Grössen." See Moses Mendelssohn, *Schriften zur Philosophie, Aesthetik und Apologetik*, ed. Moritz Brasch (Hildesheim: Olms, 1968. Originally 1880), vol. 2, 241 (the passage is in Jub A 6.1, 83). I thank Grit Schorch to pointing out this issue and the same use of "unextended magnitudes" in the prize essay *Über die Evidenz in metaphysischen Wissenschaften* in a passage in Jub A 277f., see for the English translation Mendelssohn's *On evidence in metaphysical sciences* in Moses Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 251-306, 261.
- 3 Translator's note: Mendelssohn of course means George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne.